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The article explores the recent surge of Russian military presence in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and evaluates the implications of Moscow’s decision to challenge the regional 
status quo. In November 2015, the downing of a Russian fighter jet over Syrian airspace 
turned analysts’ attention to the increasing involvement of Russia in the Syrian battlefield. 
Moscow’s entanglement in the Syrian civil war was only the latest episode in its historically 
persistent effort to establish a permanent presence in Mediterranean waters. Developments 
in recent years, however, point to a more ambitious approach. This article argues that 
Moscow’s unfolding strategy entails the gradual assertion of Russian air superiority over 
critical parts of the Eastern Mediterranean, a Russian aspiration that has been elusive even 
during the peak of the Cold War rivalry. Moscow’s grand strategy, in this regard, signals a 
renewed effort to disrupt NATO's south-eastern flank. Under this prism, the deployment of 
long-range S-400 and S-300 Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs), S-300 equipped ships and 
advanced fighter jets across regional flashpoints may prove to be a game changing initiative. 
The implications of Russia’s contemporary strategy could be important for the future of the 
Eastern Mediterranean, as Moscow’s approach appears to be upsetting the regional balance 
of power. Israel’s unchallenged dominance of the skies over Syria and Lebanon is 
compromised for the first time since 1970, when Russian air-defence forces were deployed to 
Egypt. The Turkish armed forces, moreover, will struggle to compensate for the Russian game 
plan, which complicates Ankara’s ability to project power over Syria, Iraq and the Aegean Sea. 
These dispersed airpower “webs” could, finally, restrict NATO’s capacity to deploy assets in 
the region and nullify the credibility of the alliance’s anti-ballistic shield. Overall, contemporary 
developments may enable Russia to challenge American control of a geopolitically vital area 
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Russia and the Mediterranean after the Cold War 
Ever since the times of the Ottoman expansion and the conquest of Constantinople, 
Russian leaders felt compelled to retain a strong presence in the Black Sea and the 
Eastern Mediterranean, primarily as a means to protect the country’s frontiers. After 
the Second World War, U.S. naval forces in the region were essentially converted to 
the American 6th Fleet and assumed the mission of protecting Western interests in the 
oil-rich Middle East. The prospect of “locking” the Soviet fleet in the Black Sea 
prompted the U.S.S.R. to establish its first permanent naval force in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. The 5th Mediterranean Squadron of warships managed to become an 
appreciable counterweight to NATO only in the following decade, however, with the 
U.S. maintaining a tactical advantage through the deployment of aircraft carriers.2 
For the duration of the Cold War, Turkey was a critical component of the 
Western containment policy against the Soviet Union and its allies. Because of its 
privileged geopolitical position at the crossroads of three continents and lying at the 
borders of the Eastern bloc countries, Turkey’s armed forces were accorded a 
prominent role in securing the region by both NATO and the United States. The robust 
American-Turkish relationship, moreover, bolstered after the 1960s through the cordial 
partnership between Turkey and Israel, was instrumental in promoting Western 
interests in this sensitive area.3 Despite the few instances of discord, such as the 
tensions between Turkey and its historical rival Greece, Washington viewed Ankara 
as a major stabilising force in the region and a reliable partner that could contribute to 
regional stability and safeguard the interests of the alliance.  
The end of the Cold War unleashed both NATO’s and Turkey’s latent 
geopolitical dynamic in the previously inaccessible Eurasian heartland. The collapse 
of the Soviet Union and the corresponding power vacuum in its former periphery 
created a window of opportunity for Turkey to improve its relative standing in Central 
Asia and the Caucasus, thereby reclaiming an important role in Eurasia for the first 
time since the Ottoman era.4 NATO enlargement, already underway in the mid and 
late 1990s, was regarded as a complementary tool to Ankara’s grand strategy.5 
Despite Turkish concerns that NATO expansion might render the alliance’s southern 
flank comparatively irrelevant, the reach of Euro-Atlantic institutions in a region of 
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prime Turkish concern (the Black Sea) was expected to create a “cushion” against 
Russian resurgence and hence compensate for any loss of status within the alliance. 
Turkish analysts anticipated, however, that the exclusion of Russia from Central 
and Eastern Europe could potentially fuel a more assertive stance in South-Eastern 
Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean.6 That was soon to be realized, as Russians 
viewed Turkey’s rapidly evolving cultural and security ties with states such as 
Azerbaijan and Georgia, respectively, with apprehension. Exacerbating Russian 
concerns, Turkey’s role in the Abkhazian conflict raised the prospect of a destabilizing 
Turkish involvement in the separatist Republics of Dagestan and Chechnya.7 
Moscow’s response was to develop or bolster its existing security ties to Syria, Iran, 
Greece and Cyprus, as a countermeasure to what was perceived to be an expanding 
Turkish influence across Russia’s “near abroad.”8  
To this end, the supply of advanced weaponry (and missile systems in 
particular) became a prominent policy tool. At the time, Russia had already deployed 
Scud-B missiles in Armenia9 and reportedly assisted Iran in developing 2,000 km 
range missiles, while the S-300 SAM missile system was exported to Syria in 1998.10 
Developed in the 1980s, the S-300 SAMs have the capacity to engage six targets 
simultaneously, flying as low as ten meters above the ground or as high as maximum 
aircraft ceilings. The system has a maximum operational range of 150 km for fighter 
jets and 40 km for ballistic missiles, with tests indicating a very high probability of 
destroying acquired targets.11 Such specifications imply that the S-300 can be 
classified as a strategic, as opposed to a tactical, weapon. Thus, besides the need to 
seek new markets for the Russian armaments industry, Russian weaponry entailed a 
grand strategic logic that was hard to ignore. In late 1997, the Turkish General Staff 
prepared a report which accorded the S-300 system a central role in what was viewed 
as an “offensive ring” engulfing Turkey’s coastline, which included sensitive military as 
well as civilian assets, such as major ports and oil pipelines.12 
 
Russian retrenchment and its aftermath 
However ambitious, Russia’s attempt to gain a foothold in the Mediterranean during 
the 1990s was largely unsuccessful. Syria, probably the most committed Russian ally 
in the region, engaged in discussions with Israel over the future status of the Golan 
Heights (under Israeli control since the Six Day War of 1967) while its influence in 
Lebanon was gradually eroded, leading to the eventual withdrawal of the Syrian 
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army.13 Greece and Cyprus, meanwhile, chose to undertake a major foreign policy 
adjustment vis-à-vis Turkey in the late 1990s, after major crises in the Aegean Sea 
(1996) and Cyprus (1998), with the latter directly related to the procurement of S-300 
SAMs by the Cypriot government.14 The moderate government in Athens, led by the 
Europeanist Costas Simitis, prioritized de-escalation and cooperation with the Turkish 
leadership, in an effort to diffuse tensions in the Aegean Sea and Cyprus.  
The Greek foreign policy shift was reflected in the country’s 1996 defence 
procurement program, drafted shortly after the tense 1996 Aegean Sea crisis. While 
a number of Russian weapons were selected by the Greek government, the purchase 
of such systems as long range missiles or Russian fighter jets was disfavoured, as 
Athens prioritized the “Europeanization” of bilateral issues with Turkey.15 Initially, 
Cyprus appeared eager to sustain its close security relationship with Moscow, 
continuing its unfolding armament program which included T-80 MBTs, BMP-3 AIFVs 
and BUK M1-2 anti-aircraft systems, among others. The change of attitude in Athens, 
however, would soon impact on Cypriot security policy. While the highly publicized S-
300 purchase by the Cypriot government in 1997 could not be averted, Athens and 
Nicosia decided to transfer and quietly “store” the touted missile system in the Greek 
island of Crete, with the first test fire occurring in 2013.16 While the S-300 cold storage 
in Crete was then viewed as a tactical retreat by Athens and Nicosia in the face of 
Turkish escalation, it became evident in subsequent years that Cyprus had decided to 
substantially scale back its military procurement program so as to avoid similar crises 
in the future. As a result, Russia’s ability to influence these historically friendly states, 
both strategically located within NATO’s southern flank, was severely curtailed. 
Russia, at the same time had its own issues to attend to, closer to home. The 
economic crisis of 1998 dealt a major blow to the Russian economy, which was still 
recovering from the shock of the Communist collapse. Moscow defaulted on its debt 
and the national currency was devalued at a time when the upheaval in Chechnya 
threatened the integrity of the Russian Federation.17  If there was any doubt about 
Russia’s incapacity to restore its Cold War era geopolitical reach, NATO’s Serbia 
bombing campaign ensured that Moscow would receive the message in a loud and 
clear manner. At one point during the Kosovo crisis, Russian and NATO troops 
operated in the same area for the first time after the end of the Cold War, raising 
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concerns that the two sides would actually confront one another.18 The Russian 
acknowledgment of NATO primacy, however, showcased in a dramatic way the 
conventional capability gap between the two former rivals. While Moscow maintained 
a nuclear deterrent, the state of the country’s air and naval fleets indicated that any 
plans for power projection activities would have to be put on hold, at least temporarily. 
In the following years, Moscow prioritized internal stability and then focused on 
deflecting NATO’s attempts to expand in the Russian “near abroad.” The Georgian 
and Ukrainian cases took precedence for Vladimir Putin, who perceived NATO 
expansion as detrimental to Russian security.19  
 
Moscow returns to the Mediterranean 
The Arab Spring movement, a revolutionary wave of protests and civil wars in the Arab 
world, captured Moscow’s attention, as it entailed an element of threat to Russian 
interests. Russian diplomatic support of the secular, though oppressive, regimes in the 
Eastern Mediterranean did not prevent the ouster of Muammar Gaddafi from Libya 
after the NATO-backed military strikes in 2011. The civil war in Syria transferred the 
“battlefield” to an area of prime concern to Moscow, threatening Russia’s closest ally 
in the region, the Assad regime. In the run up to, and during, the Syrian civil war, 
Russia provided a friendly voice for the Assad regime in the United Nations and other 
fora, deflecting decisions and policies deemed harmful to Damascus.20 Initially, 
however, Moscow stopped short of committing troops in support of the Syrian 
government. The Syrian turmoil swiftly devolved into chaos, rendering Russia wary of 
the potential repercussions, with Vladimir Putin asserting that “The collapse of Syria’s 
official authorities will only mobilize terrorists.”21 The prevailing view in Moscow 
considered Western interventions in Iraq and North Africa responsible for the rise and 
expansion of the so-called Islamic State (IS).22 
The West paid little attention to Russian concerns, partly due to the weak 
military presence of the Russian fleet in the region. The chronic underinvestment in 
Russia’s decaying Black Sea fleet, based in Crimea, had taken its toll on the country’s 
power projection capabilities.23 This was about to change. On February 2013, Russian 
                                                          
18 V. Gobarev, “Russia‐NATO relations after the Kosovo crisis: Strategic implications,” The Journal of Slavic 
Military Studies, 12:3 (1999), 1-17. 
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20   A. Tilghman and O. Pawlyk, “U.S. vs. Russia: What a War Would Look like between the World’s Most 
Fearsome Militaries,” Military Times, 5 October 2015, www.militarytimes.com/ [accessed 1 November 2016]. 
21 A. Stent, “Putin’s Power Play in Syria: How to Respond to Russia’s Intervention,” Foreign Affairs, 95:1 
(January-February 2016), 109.  
22 “Russian Envoy to UN: American occupation should be blamed for the rise of ISIS,” RT Network, 16 
September 2015, https://www.rt.com/news/315586-us-occupation-isis-origin/, [accessed 21 October 2016]; “Putin 
Blames Foreign Interference for Rise of ISIS in Middle East,” International Business Times, 26 May 2015, 
www.ibtimes.com/putin-blames-foreign-interference-rise-isis-middle-east-1938421 [accessed 10 January 2017]. 
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Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu emphasised that “the Mediterranean is at the core of 
all essential dangers to Russian national interests.”24 That year was a turning point for 
Russian security thinking, as a decision was reached to create a permanent 
Mediterranean Squadron comprised of ships from the Black Sea fleet.25 The country’s 
mid-term planning envisaged that by 2020, 132 billion USD (almost a quarter of total 
projected defence outlays for the period) would be devoted towards upgrading its 
naval capabilities. By 2014, the Black Sea fleet featured 6 Kilo class submarines, 
11,000 marines, and a surface contingent of 42 ships.26 This Mediterranean armada, 
integrated in the Black Sea fleet, quickly became visible through its activities in the 
Aegean Sea and adjacent areas. In addition to hosting Russia’s sole aircraft carrier at 
times, the task force has grown to include more than 10 ships (including warships and 
support vessels) on a permanent basis.27  
Besides Russia’s major naval investment program, the assertion of full control 
over the Crimean peninsula consolidated a balance of power in the Black Sea that 
seems particularly favourable for Moscow, taking into consideration that Sevastopol 
remains the “only naval base in the Black Sea capable of outfitting and dispatching 
new vessels and military hardware at a strategically significant level.”28 In force 
projection terms, however, this means little if Russian access to the Mediterranean is 
“filtered” by the Bosporus Straits. The Straits “bottleneck,” a historically divisive issue 
among great powers, remains strategically relevant, as disagreements between 
Russia and Turkey over the Montreux Treaty, which regulates passage through the 
Straits, have recently resurfaced. Control of the Straits has been a Russian strategic 
challenge for quite some time. During the Crimean War (1853-1856), Sir James 
Graham, First Lord of the Admiralty, considered the Straits to be crucial towards 
thwarting Russian military power, as they could conceivably be used to “stifle” the 
Russian navy by restraining it from accessing Mediterranean waters.29  
The potential for a future standoff across the Straits, therefore, implies that 
Russia needs to maintain a robust naval force at all times in Mediterranean waters. 
Forward basing enables a navy, moreover, to sustain a larger force without increasing 
fleet size, thereby acting as a force multiplier. The logistical and operational support, 
however, of the Russian fleet would necessitate berthing agreements with littoral 
states. This has been a challenging task, admittedly, considering the geopolitical 
orientation of regional actors. In 2013, the Montenegrin government appears to have 
                                                          
24 E. Inbar, “The New Strategic Equation in the Eastern Mediterranean,“ Mideast Security and Policy Studies, 
Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, No. 109, (September 2014), 19.  
25 P. Felgenhauer, “Moscow Attempts to Extend Its Strategic Influence from the Black Sea to Mediterranean,” 
Eurasia Daily Monitor, 10:43 (2013), www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=40556&no_ 
cache=1#.V2Mj5yh96M8 [accessed 1 December 2016].  
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quietly deflected Moscow’s approach, aimed at either establishing a naval base at the 
Adriatic port of Bar or increasing the scope of support provided to Russian fleet units 
at the country’s ports.30 Rumours that Cyprus could host a Russian naval base are 
regularly making the rounds, only to be denied by the Cypriot government.31 After 
relevant bilateral agreements, Russian ships make use of, without special privileges, 
the port of Limassol on a frequent basis, while Russian military aircraft may be hosted 
in Cypriot airports during emergencies and missions of humanitarian nature.32 For both 
Montenegro and Cyprus, alignment with Euro-Atlantic institutions is a core policy pillar, 
with the former acceding to NATO in 2016 despite domestic divisions on the issue.33   
The procurement of large, power-projecting vessels could partly compensate 
for Russia’s inability to secure bases and logistical support. In this regard, the sole 
Russian aircraft carrier, the Soviet-era Admiral Kuznetsov, has been frequently 
navigating the Mediterranean, but the high cost of its maintenance and obsolete 
technology limit its primary function to the display of the Russian flag.34 Moscow 
acknowledged and tried to rectify this shortcoming by acquiring two new helicopter 
carriers from France. The procurement of the Mistral-class carriers, amphibious 
assault ships that can accommodate a load of 16 attack helicopters and up to 900 
combat soldiers,35 became swiftly a polarizing issue. The purchase was met with 
strong resistance from NATO, culminating in the capitulation of the French government 
and a bitter diplomatic standoff between France and Russia. France finally cancelled 
the order and the ships were eventually acquired by Egypt.36 
Overall, Russia’s drive to reassert its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean 
was qualified by the country’s geographic, economic and technological limitations, 
exacerbated by a well-established NATO presence in the region. The advent of the 
Arab Spring, moreover, fuelled the belief among analysts that Russia’s capacity to 
influence developments in the area would be further curtailed. Indeed, the 2011 
NATO-supported operation in Libya indicated that Moscow’s role in regional affairs 
                                                          
30 “Government refuses Russia’s request to set up a military base in Montenegro,” Independent Balkan News 
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montenegro [accessed 28 December 2016]. 
31 “Cyprus port deal gives Russian navy alternative to Tartus,” Al-Monitor, 3 March 2015, http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/03/russia-sanctions-europe-nato-economy-cyprus-mediterranean.html 
[accessed 10 November 2016]. 
32 “Russia keen to use military bases in Cyprus,” Cyprus Mail, 21 January 2015, cyprus-mail.com/2015/01/21/ 
russia-keen-to-use-military-bases-in-cyprus/ [accessed 18 November 2016]. 
33 “NATO to Sign Accession Protocol with Montenegro,” Balkan Insight, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/ 
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349928 [accessed 22 November 2016]. 
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was marginal, with the international community ignoring its objections to the ousting 
of Gaddafi. When Syria became engulfed in civil strife, the Russian naval base in the 
Syrian port city of Tartus faced the danger of being dismantled as rebels gradually 
asserted control over the country’s coastline. Overall, Russia’s position in the Eastern 
Mediterranean appeared precarious, if not irreversibly compromised.  
 
A novel Mediterranean strategy?  
The advent of the Arab Spring and the Syrian civil strife in particular, bestowed Russia 
with a renewed momentum towards increasing its impact on the Mediterranean. 
Conditions did not appear particularly favourable. NATO’s “tightening of the screws” 
around the Black Sea and Russia’s chronic military underperformance in the region 
after the Cold War resulted in Moscow taking a backseat during developments in Egypt 
and Libya. After consolidating its position in the Black Sea, however, through the 
annexation of the Crimean peninsula in 2014, Russia sought to project power in the 
Mediterranean in a credible manner. Somewhat contradicting its long-held maritime 
strategy, Russia moved to deploy long range S-300 surface to air missiles and 
forwarded advanced fighter aircraft to its Syrian bases. From its Tartus naval base and 
the Khmeimim air base in Latakia, Russia initiated joint operations with the Syrian 
army in addition to its own ground and air strikes targeting Syrian rebel groups and IS 
militants.37 Moscow’s Syrian foray, a surprising move for many analysts,38 came at a 
time of diplomatic isolation and economic crisis, due to the Western-backed sanctions 
and collapsing oil prices which had a profound effect on the Russian economy.  
The Russian intervention in Syria on September 2015 necessitated a 
commitment of military resources and diplomatic capital without a precedent for post-
Cold War Russia. Moscow’s military surge included ground attack aircraft and 
helicopters, naval vessels and marine infantry. At the end of 2016, Vladimir Putin’s 
gamble appeared to have paid off, with the Assad regime recapturing territory from 
both the IS and Syrian rebel forces, including the major city of Aleppo. While the 
stabilization of Syria remains elusive, the greatest reward for Russia is the 
acknowledgement of its role in world affairs. At the same time, Moscow signalled its 
intention to back its allies with boots on the ground, if necessary, contrasting 
perceptions regarding the credibility of American commitments in the wider region. 
Russia’s much publicized withdrawal from Syria in 2016 was only partial and primarily 
aimed at signalling Moscow’s desire to re-initiate the diplomatic effort towards a 
favourable settlement of the Syrian conflict. Analysts quickly pointed out, however, that 
Moscow’s military footprint was meant to be sustained, if not augmented, by the 
deployment of additional assets in the Syrian bases under Russian administration.39  
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Irrespective of diplomatic gains and political signals dispatched through this 
military endeavour, the conflict in Syria revealed Moscow’s unfolding strategy in the 
Eastern Mediterranean, in essence a fusion of ground and maritime lessons learned 
from past wars and crises. Russia’s involvement in the Syrian conflict disclosed the 
country’s evolved security thinking which features two complementary elements: 1) a 
permanent naval presence that has an adverse effect on NATO’s freedom of 
manoeuvre in the Mediterranean and power projection in the Middle East through the 
Suez Canal (though U.S. power projection in the Middle East is also ensured through 
the presence of the  5th Fleet in the Gulf) and 2) the gradual assertion of Russian air 
superiority over critical parts of the Eastern Mediterranean, which aims to create 
“pockets of disruption” within, or in proximity of, NATO allies. The latter characteristic 
appears to be a defining differentiation from Moscow’s post-Cold War approaches. We 
can already see the concrete results of this strategy in parts of Syria, though 
Kaliningrad and Crimea were the initial testing grounds of this doctrine. The 
deployment, in this regard, of S-300 equipped ships and the establishment of Russian 
bases hosting advanced aircraft and S-400 systems in Syrian territory may prove to 
be a game changer. This is because the Russian strategy creates an anti-access, area 
denial problem, with the prospect of a no-fly zone over critical locations. 
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Anti-access and area denial refer to war fighting strategies aimed at “preventing 
an opponent from operating military forces near, into or within a contested region.”40 
Usually combined as Anti-Access/Area Denial or abbreviated as A2/AD, similar tactics 
have been enacted in such historical instances, as the Greco-Persian wars in antiquity 
or the Falklands after they were briefly captured by Argentina.41 While denying access 
to enemy forces may be a common goal among combatants, A2/AD strategies are 
primarily used to denote a more specific approach involving asymmetrical power 
relationships. In other words, a weaker party adopts A2/AD strategies in order to avoid 
a confrontation with a more powerful opponent, who may be the defender or the 
attacker. In this manner, the more powerful actor will be unable to bring its full force in 
the operational theatre, or maximise its power by moving freely in the contested area. 
A2/AD strategies have recently come to the spotlight due to their potential applicability 
in East Asia and specifically in a hypothetical situation where China attempts to forcibly 
annex Taiwan. China would, under this scenario, keep American forces outside the 
operational theatre through attrition tactics, instead of directly confronting U.S. air and 
naval assets (the Chinese term for the doctrine is, in approximation, “active strategic 
counterattacks on exterior lines”).42  
The Russian intervention in Syria could be understood as a first step in the 
manifestation of an evolving A2/AD strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean. During the 
initial stages of the Russian operation in Syria, for instance, the majority of fighter 
aircrafts deployed did not pose a threat to Turkey’s modern F-16 fleet, as the force 
consisted of Su-25 and Su-24M, both of which possess a limited air to air capability.43 
Moscow also avoided initially the deployment of long-range missiles, preferring to 
protect the newly activated Khmeimim air base in Latakia by Short Range Air Defence 
(SHORAD) systems such as the Pantsir S-1.44 After the Su-24 downing however, 
Russia deployed Su-34s, which carry Beyond Visual Range (BVR) air to air missiles. 
A key pillar of an A2/AD envelope, advanced tactical aircraft can perform air 
interdiction and undertake land and anti-ship attacks against any forces attempting to 
breach the A2/AD zone.45  
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Moreover, Russia dispatched a missile cruiser off the Eastern Mediterranean 
coast and transferred the S-400 very long range air and missile defence system to its 
Latakia air base.46 As a result, Russia was in a position to detect, lock and destroy 
targets deep (200-300 km) into Turkish airspace, thereby establishing superiority 
within the Syrian air to air operational theatre. While the number of Russian fighter jets 
deployed may vary, the existence of such advanced missile systems reduces the need 
for Combat Air Patrol (CAP) missions by Russian aircraft. An electronic jamming 
system capable of jamming airborne radars and even low orbit satellites completed 
the tactical picture.47 Finally, a number of unmanned aircraft were deployed over Syria 
with a mission to provide targeting information. In the future, these systems could 
undertake Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) operations, as part of 
an ISR pillar against over the horizon NATO forces, complementing what appears to 
constitute a robust A2/AD strategy.48 
Technological advancements by the Russian defence industry could also offset 
some of the geographical and logistical challenges related to the Straits and Russian 
power projection. Russia’s naval doctrine can now ensure that targets are acquired 
from the safety of the Black Sea or even Russia’s extensive riverine system. The use 
of Sea Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCM) in the Syrian conflict, launched from the 
Caspian Sea, was aimed at sending a clear signal regarding the capacity of the 
Russian navy to target hostile ships and land targets at a great distance, thus 
projecting power in the Eastern Mediterranean without the danger of engaging with 
hostile forces.49 The value of conventional precision-guided, long-range weapons has 
been demonstrated after 1990 in numerous wars, as unlike nuclear weapons, their 
use is not limited to the extreme escalation levels associated with nuclear warfare. 
Their development is also indicative of possible Russian countermeasures against the 
anti-ballistic missile system NATO is gradually establishing in Eastern Europe and the 
Mediterranean.  
In the near future, the Buyan corvettes, which have a displacement of less than 
1,000 tons at full load, could sail and launch their cruise missiles from Russian rivers 
such as the Volga or the Don. They could therefore access the Russian riverine system 
from the Black Sea and deploy their cruise missiles from locations west of Moscow. 
The supersonic sea-launched Kalibr missiles, with a range of approximately 1,500 km, 
pose, for this reason, a substantial challenge to NATO assets in the region, threatening 
most notably the NATO base at Incirlik, Turkey. The impact of this development 
indicates that Moscow is in a position to challenge the American primacy on long 
range, precision-guided strike capabilities. Admiral Aleksandr Vitko, the commander 
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of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, has already stated that cruise missile-equipped ships 
will be permanently sailing in the Mediterranean.50 
Before the Russian surge in Syria, Moscow had maintained a rather low-key 
presence in the country, with the exception of the Tartus docking facility. The latter 
was mainly staffed by civilian contractors and could only host a small number of ships. 
The recent long term lease agreement with the Syrian government enabled Russia to 
initiate an expansion of the Tartus base, which will transform it to a major naval base 
comparable in scale to similar NATO facilities in the Mediterranean.51 Moreover, the 
Latakia electronic listening (SIGINT) station was set up during the Cold War but was 
not designed to host a force of Russian aircraft. Russia’s air power projection across 
the Mediterranean had thus remained a complicated issue, as its fighter jets would 
have to either cross Southern European, and thus NATO member, countries, or fly 
through the Caspian Sea, Iran and Iraq, states whose geopolitical orientation has been 
far from consistent. To complicate matters further, some of the Russian fighter jets, 
such as the Su-25s do not possess an air-refuelling capability.52 The tactical situation 
appears very different now. By means of a permanently stationed force consisting of 
attack helicopters and fighter jets, Russia is able to deter other actors from taking 
unilateral action and mobilize swiftly when necessary, in order to provide, for example, 
air cover to allied ground forces in the region. Therefore, Russian deterrence is not 
solely aimed at Syrian opposition forces or even Turkey for that matter. The S-300 
missiles operated by the Russian missile cruiser Moskva in the Mediterranean, the Su-
30 aircraft and the missiles launched from the Caspian Sea against the IS, point to a 
strong deterrent signal against U.S. and NATO unilateral initiatives in the area.53  
Overall, Russia’s posture complicates the once unrestrained capacity of NATO 
and the American 6th Fleet to ensure freedom of manoeuvre in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and power projection through the Suez Canal in the Middle East. The 
Russian naval presence in the Mediterranean, moreover, ensures that Moscow’s 
deterrence against Europeans is bolstered, as all E.U. and NATO countries now find 
themselves within striking distance of Russia’s ship-launched cruise and ballistic 
missiles. Finally, Russian surveillance and electronic warfare assets can now be 
legally and regularly deployed close to NATO listening stations in Turkey and the 
British Royal Air-Force base in Cyprus (Akrotiri), further compromising NATO’s long-
held advantage in intelligence collection and electronic warfare. The Alliance thus finds 
itself in a vulnerable position during a time of upheaval in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
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NATO’s potential response 
NATO planning had to adjust to Russia’s posture in the Mediterranean. In October 
2015, the alliance carried out its most ambitious manoeuvres in the Mediterranean 
with approximately 36,000 troops, 140 aircraft and 60 ships pooled from over 30 
countries, some of which, like Australia, are not even NATO members.54 The 
TRIDENT JUNCTURE 2015 exercise, hosted by Italy, Spain and Portugal, was 
officially testing the alliance’s response mechanisms under a hypothetical scenario of 
instability in the Horn of Africa. The actual recipient of the message, however, was 
intended to be Moscow. On 20 October 2015, the American Navy announced that a 
NATO vessel stationed in the Spanish naval base of Rota had successfully intercepted 
a ballistic missile (for the first time in a European theatre) as part of a missile defence 
demonstration. The announcement, which came two weeks after the surprise launch 
of 26 cruise missiles from the Caspian Sea by Russian warships against Syrian 
targets, was clearly aimed at signalling NATO’s intention to defend the alliance’s 
standing in the Eastern Mediterranean.  
In 2016, Jens Stoltenberg, the secretary general of NATO, announced that the 
alliance is planning to expand its presence in the Mediterranean by transforming the 
ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR operation “into a broader security operation.”55 The credibility 
of a U.S. long term commitment in the region should be questioned, however. In 
multiple occasions after the end of the Cold War, American policymakers emphasized 
Europe’s capacity and responsibility to guarantee its own security and also ensure the 
stability of its neighbourhood. In the absence, however, of a strong and reliable E.U. 
security/defence apparatus, NATO has been the cornerstone of the European security 
architecture. Moreover, the continent’s financial stalemate has rendered E.U. leaders 
reluctant to increase defence spending and assume additional security-related tasks.  
The so-called U.S. “pivot to Asia,” initiated by the Obama administration, sent 
a strong signal regarding the future of American grand strategy, corresponding to 
changing priorities. A first step in this direction was taken through the transfer of U.S. 
naval assets in the Asia Pacific, aiming at deterring China from adopting policies that 
could prove detrimental to U.S. interests.56 The nature of threats in the Asia Pacific 
(flashpoints in the South China Sea, Taiwan and the Malacca Straits) places the 
maritime and air components at the heart of the American strategy in the region, 
casting into doubt the capacity of the already stretched U.S. military to sustain a 
deterrent against both Russia and China within an area from the Suez to the Malacca 
straits. The ascendance of Donald Trump in the American Presidency may add further 
fuel to this change of priorities. Washington’s rudimentary participation in the 
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diplomatic efforts to end the Syrian conflict in recent months appears consistent with 
a gradual U.S. disengagement from the Eastern Mediterranean. 
The aforementioned U.S. strategic shift could be part of the historical “ebb and 
flow” of American involvement in Europe, though it hardly seems like a short term 
caprice. From the first Gulf War in 1990-91 to the “War on Terror” a decade later, the 
U.S. has been steadily adjusting its perception of the Mediterranean; from a 
confrontation stage against the Soviet Union, the region became a forward launch pad 
or even a transit point towards the Gulf States and the Indian Ocean, where significant 
American interests lie. The waning of American dependence on Gulf energy resources 
can only accelerate the U.S. decoupling from the region. As of 2016, the 6th Fleet has 
a single command ship and four destroyers permanently assigned to the force, all 
based at Rota, Spain, with only rotational presence in the Eastern Mediterranean from 
ships passing through the area on the way to, or back from, the Middle East.57 
Nevertheless, there is always at least one Arleigh Burke-class destroyer in the area 
as part of NATO’s anti-ballistic defence umbrella. 
The inconvenient reality is that the rest of the NATO allies have been doing little 
to compensate for the U.S. realignment; the drastic reduction of European defence 
spending and the commitment of NATO assets away from the Mediterranean (NATO 
ships take part in the OCEAN SHIELD operation in the Indian Ocean for instance) 
have created a hard to ignore security vacuum. In the short term, the United States 
will most likely transfer combat ships and perhaps aircraft from other operational 
theatres, though this strategic “band aid” should only partially alleviate the alliance’s 
credibility problem. In the long term, European littoral states would need to take the 
helm, both politically and militarily, in a hypothetical regional confrontation with Russia. 
Even if a political decision is reached by the Europeans to rise to the occasion, their 
capability shortcomings will be hard to overcome. The lack of ASW capabilities of 
regional navies for instance, with the exception of the Italian FREMM frigates, puts 
regional players at a disadvantage, considering the strengths of the Russian navy.58 
Russia, in this respect, appears to have taken the initiative in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and the Syrian conflict showcases that the security order in the region 
is now contested. This is a major turn of events, as until recently, most analysts 
regarded Russian military capabilities with disdain.59 The Financial Times admitted 
that “Russia has not had any sizeable presence in the Mediterranean since the end of 
the cold war. And a lack of investment until recently in its decaying Black Sea fleet, 
based in Crimea, had led many strategic military planners to overlook the entire theatre 
as a possible source of concern when it came to Moscow.”60 Alexander Vershbow, 
NATO’s Deputy Secretary General, clearly articulates the alliance’s adjusted 
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perception of Russia when he characterizes Russia’s presence south of the Bosporus 
as “disruptive,” adding that NATO needs to “think about the broader consequences of 
this build up in the Eastern Mediterranean and the capacity of these airbases.”61  
 
Implications for the Eastern Mediterranean 
It is worth noting that NATO allies have recently devoted considerable resources in 
their effort to understand Russian intentions and predict its future behavior.62 The 
comprehensive reform of NATO’s doctrine and structure were primarily aimed at 
monitoring and anticipating potential challenges to Central and Eastern European 
countries.63 Following the escalation of the Ukrainian conflict in 2014, the American 
political establishment intensified this effort, committing substantial assets to the 
scrutiny of Moscow’s motivations and capabilities.64 Tensions over Ukraine rekindled 
threat perceptions in the highest echelons of power within the Atlantic Community, 
eliciting the expectation that Russia would imminently target the Baltic States and 
perhaps Poland.65 Moscow, however, chose to promote a “frozen” conflict scenario in 
2015, in which Eastern Ukrainian provinces would avoid severing ties with Kiev. In a 
surprising turn of events, Odessa, a Black Sea port of great strategic and symbolic 
value to Russia, did not become a flashpoint for separatist forces.66 
This does not necessarily imply that the competition between NATO and Russia 
in Eastern Europe is over. It may be indicative, however, of the “transfer” of the East-
West rivalry into a more contested theatre, that of the Eastern Mediterranean. Russia’s 
direct involvement in the quagmire of the Syrian conflict entailed a robust commitment 
of political and military capital during a year of financial stress and diplomatic isolation 
for Moscow.67 A critical question is whether Russia aims to take the next step and 
upgrade its missile defence strategy. An airpower web consisting of advanced fighter 
jets and ballistic missiles may, in the mid-term, restrict NATO’s capacity to deploy 
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assets in the Mediterranean, with Russia essentially challenging American control of 
a vital area that has been uncontested since the end of the Second World War. This 
would be a major development for the entire region as a Theatre Missile Defence 
(TMD) system, while defensive in nature, has the capacity to overturn an existing 
balance of power by undercutting other states’ deterrent capabilities, or by providing 
coverage for offensive forces. During a crisis between Russia and NATO, Moscow 
could take advantage of deployed SAMs and declare a no-fly zone or, alternatively, 
an air-defence identification zone in order to prevent hostile forces from reaching Syria 
for example. Under this scenario, the credibility of NATO and its members would be 
put to the test. 
Russia’s Mediterranean buildup may equally alter the posture of regional 
actors, whose conduct may be critical in times of crisis. The role of Turkey and Egypt, 
both in control of choke point access in the Black and Red Seas respectively, is far 
from certain under a hypothetical crisis scenario, even though the former is a full NATO 
member. Bulgaria’s refusal to take part in the establishment of a permanent NATO-
led force in the Black Sea signifies the reluctance of regional actors to antagonize 
Moscow in an area of historical importance for Russian interests.68 Problematic access 
to the Black and Red Seas, or even a delay of reinforcements in the course of a 
security crisis could have detrimental effects on NATO’s deterrence credibility, leading 
other states in the region, such as Greece and Italy, to further question their 
commitment to NATO goals and priorities.  
Israel’s unchallenged dominance of the skies over Syria and Lebanon, 
moreover, could be compromised for the first time since 1970, when Russian air 
defence forces were deployed to Egypt in what is referred to in Israel as the “War of 
Attrition.69” Throughout the Syrian crisis, Moscow and Jerusalem maintained an 
intensive dialogue over developments in Syria. The goal was to ensure that Israeli and 
Russian fighter jets would not collide, as the Israeli Air-Force undertook operations in 
Syria, striking targets associated with Hezbollah, the Lebanon-based militant group 
which dispatched forces in support of the Assad regime. While Israelis are historically 
reluctant to provide information over their military operations, the maintenance of an 
open line between Putin and Netanyahu indicates that Israel may be willing to accept 
a Russian presence in the region.70 It remains to be seen whether this will still be the 
case if Russia upgrades its capabilities in areas of Israeli concern. A question, finally, 
emerges regarding a potential collaboration between Russian forces in Syria and 
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irregular groups such as the Hezbollah, which could assume the role of a Russian 
proxy in the region, creating a rift between Russia and Israel.  
Finally, a Russian air defence umbrella in the Eastern Mediterranean brings 
back memories of the S-300 crisis in Cyprus. In 1997, the Cypriot effort to upgrade the 
island's anti-aircraft capabilities through the purchase of the S-300 SAM system led to 
a tense crisis that was resolved when the missiles were stored in the Greek island of 
Crete. The Cypriot rationale for procuring the missiles was tactical, as well as political. 
Since the establishment of Cyprus as a sovereign state in 1960, and particularly after 
the 1974 Turkish invasion and partition of the island, successive Cypriot governments 
have exerted a consistent effort to ensure the survivability of the Republic through 
military acquisitions. A pervasive sense of insecurity, combined with a deadlock in bi-
communal negotiations, led to a more assertive security policy which lasted for 
approximately a decade (1989-1998), epitomised by the Integrated Defence Space 
pact with Greece. Overall, Cyprus aimed at challenging the local balance of 
capabilities by establishing a credible deterrent force, which featured a robust air 
defence component.71 The S-300 “fiasco,” as it is remembered among political circles, 
led to a drastic Cypriot security policy adjustment72 which, to this day, emphasizes a 
minimum deterrence capability and the avoidance of escalation. It is thus highly 
unlikely that Cyprus will consider another arms build-up anytime soon, even though 
the Republic finds itself amidst a tense geopolitical environment.  
Turkey’s long term response to Russia’s conduct in the Eastern Mediterranean, 
however, remains enigmatic. While Russia and Turkey appear to have established an 
uneasy understanding regarding the Syrian conflict, the Russian A2/AD strategy may 
well lead to further antagonisms between the two neighbours. In the coming years, 
Russia could expand its network of missile systems in the area, through establishing 
bases armed with S-300/400 SAMs or even more advanced systems in Syria or Egypt, 
for example. Another possibility is a long term presence of S-300 equipped Russian 
naval assets in the vicinity. Moscow has indeed announced that its Kirov class battle 
cruisers will be equipped with a naval variant of the S-400 by 2022.73 These 
developments would imply that Cyprus, or at least parts of the Cypriot airspace, could 
be covered by a Russian air defence umbrella.  
Considering Turkey’s undisputed air superiority over the island, this 
development could affect the regional security outlook in a dramatic way. The Turkish 
reaction to the Cyprus S-300 crisis between 1997 and 1998 was indicative of the 
potential impact of such developments. Throughout the crisis, the Turkish Ministry of 
Defence compared its obligation to prevent the S-300 deployment with that of 
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Washington to stop the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1963.74 Nevertheless, 
it was extremely difficult for Ankara to antagonize Russia’s attempt to install its 
missiles. In August 1997, Turkish authorities stopped and searched the Egyptian 
vessel Al-Qusair, after allegedly receiving information that the ship was carrying (S-
300) missile parts.75 In this manner, Turkey indicated its opposition to the deal, but 
chose to avoid a direct provocation to Moscow by selecting a ship that did not carry 
the Russian flag. It is highly unlikely that Russian assets, whether located in a base or 
on board a vessel, would be targeted by the Turkish armed forces.  
On a final note, Russia’s capacity to challenge and surprise the West in recent 
years should lead both NATO and the E.U. to reassess the way strategic assessments 
are conducted. Despite its relative military and financial weakness, Moscow has 
proven capable of drawing accurate inferences about Western intentions and 
capabilities. This enables its policy-planners to engage in brinkmanship, strategic 
surprise and the gradual erosion of NATO deterrence in Europe. Even if one uses the 
label of opportunism to characterize Russian behavior, opportunity is a function of 
capability, to an extent. This apparent failure of the West could potentially be attributed 
to a rather simplistic image of Russia as an unpredictable and disruptive actor in 
international politics. While Russia cannot be classified as a liberal democracy, it 
possesses the requisite institutional depth and memory which enable the country to 
rationally internalize lessons learned from past conflicts, adapting its strategy to 
changing conditions. In that sense, Moscow behaves as a reactive, not a disruptive 
force and the evolution of Russia’s Mediterranean strategy is a case in point. In order 
to account for Russia’s behavior, therefore, a refined, more nuanced narrative is 
necessary, one that captures its ability to adapt to changing circumstances and at the 
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